One of the main goals of the global human rights agenda has been multiculturalism, the notion of inclusion, and thus democratic ideals. In the past several decades, these ideals have manifested in what Bain Attwood calls “the age of testimony” (2008). The rise of memory and recording of experience as a form of truth has emerged prominently in the legal realm of truth commissions and the official documents they produce. While the human rights community has proclaimed these institutionalized official sites of memory to restore marginalized voices, redeem the violent past, and bring transitioning nation states into democracy, scholars have begun to question the limitations of testimony’s authority and the process by which it becomes an official history of and heals the new nation. Bain Attwood, Deborah Posel, Julie Taylor, and Lessie Jo Frazier explain the use and shortfalls of memory’s redemptive and healing function in the cases of South Africa, Argentina, and Chile. They ask what the limitations and possible harms are of testimony’s presumed ability to heal and the way it bring haunted pasts into present human rights discourse.
In “In the Age of Testimony: The Stolen Generations Narrative, “Distance,” and Public History”, Bain Attwood explains the rupture between traditional historicism and the new role given to testimony and experience. As he puts it, “history making has been democratized” (Attwood 2008, 75). Traditional history and historicism have centered on the notion of distantiation, “the process of putting the past at a distance from the present” (2008, 76). The distance of the historian also implies his or her separation from the object of study, between objective knower and the knowable subject; however, a series of radical social movements following the rise of the global human rights agenda in the 1960s and 1970s began to challenge this divide. These movements—involved in issues of race, gender, and class— advocated for history from below, the recovery of the marginalized and hidden pasts of “the poor, migrants, slaves and indigenous peoples, gay men, and lesbian women” (2008, 79). The status of history thus began to shift from studying what happened in the past to studying how its participants experienced the past, therefore calling for oral history. As Attwood explains, the most important element of this change was the “shift in the location of historical power and authority from the professional historian, the elite, and the oppressors to the oral interviewee or witness” (2008, 79). History became a democratic endeavor as the site of history and historical knowledge moved to the site of the witness.
Through bringing marginalized voices of the past to light, oral history and narrative entail a different relationship of past to present. Whereas historicism creates distance between the two, testimony and the rise of memory create “a connecting of past and present; “then” and “now” become entangled with one another,” bringing the historian and observer into “closer proximity with the past” (2008, 80). Nowhere has this been more evident than in the connections between traumatic memory, the public realm, and the legal sphere. Memories of trauma “resists historicism’s organization of time into a chronologically linear schema of before-and-after”. Attwood quotes Dominick LaCapra on the notion that “in traumatic memory the past is not simply history as over and done with. It lives on experientially and haunts and possesses the self of the community” (2008, 81). This haunting destroys the notion that past and present are separate entities, resisting closure and a clean break from the past. As these “histories of below” have centered on voices of suffering, the witness and the ever-present past has become a dominant way people experience the past in the public sphere. The traditional public task of history to explain the past has given way to make the viewer and citizen “experience the past” (2008, 84). Witnessing, testimony, and experience have become “much more that of the transmission of pasts to future generations…a link between the faces and voices of witness and those who listen to them” (2008, 86). This concept—the relation of witness, experience, and listening—is central to the role of testimony and its affiliation to healing.
The authority of experience, testimony, and its perceived ability to heal is most evident in the legal sphere of public life. Attwood points to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission in Australia and its reliance on oral testimony by Aboriginals. The commission “encouraged those who had been removed to testify to their suffering…it was a way of obtaining knowledge about the past, but in addition, and most of all, it was a means of transmitting the past in such a way as to enable those who bore its burdens to be both heard and healed” (2008 87). As it becomes a dominant force in public life, testimony receives the authority of both obtaining and transmitting knowledge. As an act of hearing and healing, testimony performs what Attwood notes as the “politics of sentimental feeling”, the triggering of an emotional response to action by the audience (2008, 88). Deborah Posel and Julie Taylor elaborate on the redemptive function of testimony and the truth it seeks to capture and produce in their respective articles, “History as Confession: The Case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission” and “Body Memories: Aide-Memories and Collective Amnesia in the Wake of the Argentine Terror”.
The entity of the truth commission emerged into the human rights movements in 1973 as Argentina sought to transition from its violent military regime into a democratic nation, and has since been followed by 36 similar commissions, with the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) being the most well known and prominent model. Utilized in stages of transition from chaos to order, truth commissions work to “unify and reconcile by exposing the horrors that past oppressors had denied or hidden and by then passing resolute and robust judgment on what had gone wrong” (Posel 2008, 121). Following the idea of “history from below”, truth commissions attempt to rebuild the new nation from its dark past by including the voices that the previous regime had silenced, oppressed, violated, and excluded. By exposing the past horrors of a military regime or apartheid through the testimonies and traumatic memory, truth commissions work to simultaneously “commission and commemorate the past” (2008 122). These testimonies of trauma become a form of truth and are “documented as the core of an official record of a troubled past” (2008 121). As Attwood earlier explains, the individual and his or her testimony has become a direct site of “the truth,” and therefore truth commissions assign a prominent place to victimhood and memories of trauma.
Truth, in this context, carries the potential and the function to heal, attending to “the damage done to individuals, interpersonal relationships, and the nation as a whole” (2008, 129). A period such as apartheid damaged all members of South African society, and thus the truth commission of the TRC, for example, was based on the premise that “Healing is speaking” (2008, 138). While the act of recognizing the humanity of the other, both victim and perpetrator, ubuntu, was central to the truth and healing project, the TRC struggled with the dilemma of how to produce an authoritative account of “the truth” when so many perspectives and voices were at stake. Moving away from a period of incredible exclusion, the TRC and the legal reports it produced grappled with how to include while creating a definite legal documentation and official memory record of apartheid:
…it has become impossible not to acknowledge a multiplicity of perspectives—as personal truths—which coexist with the official, impersonal, and authoritative truth produced by the commission’s rigorous investigations. (2008, 127)
Claims to an authoritative truth must be demonstrated while, as Posel states, “the idea of truth has never before been as widely and intensely discredited as it has been since the late 1970s” (2008, 124), due to the above recognition of the multiplicity of perspectives at stake. Here is the central paradox of the idea of the truth commission: it must restore truth as a possible and desired endeavor while facing the fact that the same claims to truth became the tools to the violent eras and suppression from which they seek to escape.
The act of writing testimonies into an official document of the past is central to this project of truth construction, inclusion, and the creation of an official memory of the new imagined community (Posel 2008, 121). In the documents produced by the truth commissions, there is the notion that truth itself is a means to an end, that by working the narrative truths of different subjunctives into legal documentation, the nation can be healed, a catharsis can take place, and the nation can move on. In the Argentina case of 1973, the National Commission on Disappeared People sought to record and remember the terror from the country’s military period in the form of the Never Again documents. These documents, Julie Taylor notes, “were one solution to remembering terror…to create an official memory of events that were never to be forgotten…for which no history yet existed” (1994, 194). Its purpose was, as would be the case of the future TRC, to diagnose and prevent future instances of human rights violation. Taylor quotes Lawrence Wescher on the notion that the establishment of an official truth is “a powerful, almost magical notion, because often everyone already knows the truth…Why, then, this need to risk everything to render that knowledge explicit?” (1994, 195). The official sanctioning of knowledge, of the past through testimony, is central here; however, it poses the notion that the desire of truth possibly is more pressing than the desire for justice, which Taylor finds so problematic. As she notes, despite the celebration of these documents as the answer to violence, in Brazil and Uruguay “not one torturer has gone to jail, nor even to court, on the basis of the Never Again documents” (1994, 193).
Taylor posits whether the “valorization of previously marginal voices” (Posel 2008, 123) and the legal mode of their obtainment and sanctioning is enough: “We might discover something profoundly important about the problem of memory and the perpetuation of terror by examining the notion that meticulous recording is a solution to violence” (1994, 193). Central to this dilemma is the fact that the members of the military period in Argentina have been returning to political life at the will of democracy. Taylor observes the 1973 tribunal and the Never Again documents it produced resorted “to forms…that impede dealing with the exclusionary political nature of the violence and even participates in it” (1994, 196). In the trials of the coup d’etat and the oral narratives that they obtained, the actors within this political event were stripped of their political affiliations and “collective political motivations were thus not recognized” (1994, 197). While law was used to bring about truth, the law itself acted as an exclusionary force, perpetuating the “atomization of collective identities into rights and motivations of the individuals whose testimony the court admitted” (1994, 197). Taylor points to this kind of inherent “violence” in official memory projects aimed at the truth. The project of the truth commission also employs hierarchy, ordering what is necessary to include in the documentation and what is not, forcing some voices or central information out of the image, out of the imagined community of the new nation.
These removed voices become forgotten as remembering becomes “a process of forgetting…a process of simultaneously constructing some subjective and doing violence to others” (1994, 200). Although the TRC came long after the Argentina case and therefore could improve upon its predecessor, Posel notes its capacity too to exclude in its attempt to heal the nation’s: “…the cases heard in these hearings had to function as an appropriately representative sample of the whole—but only symbolically, not statistically” (2008, 138). This symbolic representation fit into the new mix of race, gender, and political affiliation that comprised its new “rainbow nation” and thus followed its own hierarchy and exclusions of potential reality of apartheid (2008, 139). Therefore, as Taylor aptly states, “memory does not only salvage, construct, and invent. Memory as constituted is exclusionary: it omits what hierarchy does not recognize,” and as such might contain “capacities to trivialize and exclude experience” (1994, 202). The construction of the truth for legal ends, even for truth itself, is political in nature, and thus, enacts a violence of its own, demonstrating the exclusionary nature of any universal claim (Taylor 1994, 199).
By distorting reality through documentation, whether through Never Again or the TRC’s symbolic rather than statistical representation of the nation, we may allow these violations to reoccur. Lessie Jo Frazier’s study, ““Subverted Memories”: Countermourning as Political Action in Chile”, explores how this process of exclusion and forgetting can be fought in what she explains as countermourning, the refusal to “relinquish the past and grope[s] toward a politics that might allow their memories integrity with a vision for the future” (1999, 105). The Chilean case too demonstrates the story of moving the nation out of a violent and painful past into the neoliberal state and economy. As the military sought to implement its own official memory by banning civil society actions, veterans fought in public spaces in what Jo Frazier terms the subversion of memory (1999, 106). Crypts and funerals, as sites of traumatic memory, provided a space of not only commemoration and remembrance, but also the enabling of but also political action (1999, 110). While she notes the homogenizing nature of the law and the truth commissions for healing, she comments that the work of mourning itself may not be sufficient to heal a damaged society: “Memory raised in elegy cannot transform the conditions of life. Without plot there may be ethics but there can be not politics, no hope of bliss” (1999, 111).
Instead, Jo Frazier advocates to look at memory as “praxis rather than text” (1999, 116). In Chile, the regime transition occurred without any major restructuring of the state or military order. In Argentina and elsewhere in Latin America, the Never Again documents did not bring torturers to justice nor did it prevent dictators from being reelected to office. To the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Posel comments that the “process of truth telling, in turn, forms a mode of justice which is more reconciliatory than punitive, based on the admissions of wrongdoing and the moral catharsis this affords” (2008, 126). While the rise of testimony and the use of memory have worked to reclaim the identity of minority groups, helped to transmit the past, and sought to repair the exclusions of the past, it has obtained an authority that promises redemption, promises a healing truth (Attwood 2008, 90). Testimony may offer catharsis and a release from the burdens of the past, but as Taylor and Jo Frazier note, this does not assure a politics or even justice as the cases show. While searching for the truth that will heal the damaged nation, the truth commission and its written productions may in fact exclude subjects as it brings the past into the present through trauma. Furthermore, the desiring of closure through this truth might only add to the difficulty in challenging this exclusion in the new “transitioned” nation.
Works Cited
1. Attwood, Bain, "In the Age of Testimony: The Stolen Generations Narrative, 'Distance' and Public History" Public Culture: Transnational Cultural Studies 20, 2008 : 75-96.
2. Frazier, Lessie Jo, "Subverted memories: Countermourning as Political Action in Chile [8pgs]" in , Acts of Memory U. Press of New England, 1999: 105-119.
3. Posel, Deborah, "History as Confession: The Case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission" Public Culture: Transnational Cultural Studies 20, 2008 : 119-141.
4. Taylor, Julie, "Body Memories: Aide-Memoires and Collective Amnesia in the Wake of Argentine Terror [6 pgs]" in , Body Politics: Disease, Desire, and the Family West View Press, 1994: pp. 192-203.
In “In the Age of Testimony: The Stolen Generations Narrative, “Distance,” and Public History”, Bain Attwood explains the rupture between traditional historicism and the new role given to testimony and experience. As he puts it, “history making has been democratized” (Attwood 2008, 75). Traditional history and historicism have centered on the notion of distantiation, “the process of putting the past at a distance from the present” (2008, 76). The distance of the historian also implies his or her separation from the object of study, between objective knower and the knowable subject; however, a series of radical social movements following the rise of the global human rights agenda in the 1960s and 1970s began to challenge this divide. These movements—involved in issues of race, gender, and class— advocated for history from below, the recovery of the marginalized and hidden pasts of “the poor, migrants, slaves and indigenous peoples, gay men, and lesbian women” (2008, 79). The status of history thus began to shift from studying what happened in the past to studying how its participants experienced the past, therefore calling for oral history. As Attwood explains, the most important element of this change was the “shift in the location of historical power and authority from the professional historian, the elite, and the oppressors to the oral interviewee or witness” (2008, 79). History became a democratic endeavor as the site of history and historical knowledge moved to the site of the witness.
Through bringing marginalized voices of the past to light, oral history and narrative entail a different relationship of past to present. Whereas historicism creates distance between the two, testimony and the rise of memory create “a connecting of past and present; “then” and “now” become entangled with one another,” bringing the historian and observer into “closer proximity with the past” (2008, 80). Nowhere has this been more evident than in the connections between traumatic memory, the public realm, and the legal sphere. Memories of trauma “resists historicism’s organization of time into a chronologically linear schema of before-and-after”. Attwood quotes Dominick LaCapra on the notion that “in traumatic memory the past is not simply history as over and done with. It lives on experientially and haunts and possesses the self of the community” (2008, 81). This haunting destroys the notion that past and present are separate entities, resisting closure and a clean break from the past. As these “histories of below” have centered on voices of suffering, the witness and the ever-present past has become a dominant way people experience the past in the public sphere. The traditional public task of history to explain the past has given way to make the viewer and citizen “experience the past” (2008, 84). Witnessing, testimony, and experience have become “much more that of the transmission of pasts to future generations…a link between the faces and voices of witness and those who listen to them” (2008, 86). This concept—the relation of witness, experience, and listening—is central to the role of testimony and its affiliation to healing.
The authority of experience, testimony, and its perceived ability to heal is most evident in the legal sphere of public life. Attwood points to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission in Australia and its reliance on oral testimony by Aboriginals. The commission “encouraged those who had been removed to testify to their suffering…it was a way of obtaining knowledge about the past, but in addition, and most of all, it was a means of transmitting the past in such a way as to enable those who bore its burdens to be both heard and healed” (2008 87). As it becomes a dominant force in public life, testimony receives the authority of both obtaining and transmitting knowledge. As an act of hearing and healing, testimony performs what Attwood notes as the “politics of sentimental feeling”, the triggering of an emotional response to action by the audience (2008, 88). Deborah Posel and Julie Taylor elaborate on the redemptive function of testimony and the truth it seeks to capture and produce in their respective articles, “History as Confession: The Case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission” and “Body Memories: Aide-Memories and Collective Amnesia in the Wake of the Argentine Terror”.
The entity of the truth commission emerged into the human rights movements in 1973 as Argentina sought to transition from its violent military regime into a democratic nation, and has since been followed by 36 similar commissions, with the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) being the most well known and prominent model. Utilized in stages of transition from chaos to order, truth commissions work to “unify and reconcile by exposing the horrors that past oppressors had denied or hidden and by then passing resolute and robust judgment on what had gone wrong” (Posel 2008, 121). Following the idea of “history from below”, truth commissions attempt to rebuild the new nation from its dark past by including the voices that the previous regime had silenced, oppressed, violated, and excluded. By exposing the past horrors of a military regime or apartheid through the testimonies and traumatic memory, truth commissions work to simultaneously “commission and commemorate the past” (2008 122). These testimonies of trauma become a form of truth and are “documented as the core of an official record of a troubled past” (2008 121). As Attwood earlier explains, the individual and his or her testimony has become a direct site of “the truth,” and therefore truth commissions assign a prominent place to victimhood and memories of trauma.
Truth, in this context, carries the potential and the function to heal, attending to “the damage done to individuals, interpersonal relationships, and the nation as a whole” (2008, 129). A period such as apartheid damaged all members of South African society, and thus the truth commission of the TRC, for example, was based on the premise that “Healing is speaking” (2008, 138). While the act of recognizing the humanity of the other, both victim and perpetrator, ubuntu, was central to the truth and healing project, the TRC struggled with the dilemma of how to produce an authoritative account of “the truth” when so many perspectives and voices were at stake. Moving away from a period of incredible exclusion, the TRC and the legal reports it produced grappled with how to include while creating a definite legal documentation and official memory record of apartheid:
…it has become impossible not to acknowledge a multiplicity of perspectives—as personal truths—which coexist with the official, impersonal, and authoritative truth produced by the commission’s rigorous investigations. (2008, 127)
Claims to an authoritative truth must be demonstrated while, as Posel states, “the idea of truth has never before been as widely and intensely discredited as it has been since the late 1970s” (2008, 124), due to the above recognition of the multiplicity of perspectives at stake. Here is the central paradox of the idea of the truth commission: it must restore truth as a possible and desired endeavor while facing the fact that the same claims to truth became the tools to the violent eras and suppression from which they seek to escape.
The act of writing testimonies into an official document of the past is central to this project of truth construction, inclusion, and the creation of an official memory of the new imagined community (Posel 2008, 121). In the documents produced by the truth commissions, there is the notion that truth itself is a means to an end, that by working the narrative truths of different subjunctives into legal documentation, the nation can be healed, a catharsis can take place, and the nation can move on. In the Argentina case of 1973, the National Commission on Disappeared People sought to record and remember the terror from the country’s military period in the form of the Never Again documents. These documents, Julie Taylor notes, “were one solution to remembering terror…to create an official memory of events that were never to be forgotten…for which no history yet existed” (1994, 194). Its purpose was, as would be the case of the future TRC, to diagnose and prevent future instances of human rights violation. Taylor quotes Lawrence Wescher on the notion that the establishment of an official truth is “a powerful, almost magical notion, because often everyone already knows the truth…Why, then, this need to risk everything to render that knowledge explicit?” (1994, 195). The official sanctioning of knowledge, of the past through testimony, is central here; however, it poses the notion that the desire of truth possibly is more pressing than the desire for justice, which Taylor finds so problematic. As she notes, despite the celebration of these documents as the answer to violence, in Brazil and Uruguay “not one torturer has gone to jail, nor even to court, on the basis of the Never Again documents” (1994, 193).
Taylor posits whether the “valorization of previously marginal voices” (Posel 2008, 123) and the legal mode of their obtainment and sanctioning is enough: “We might discover something profoundly important about the problem of memory and the perpetuation of terror by examining the notion that meticulous recording is a solution to violence” (1994, 193). Central to this dilemma is the fact that the members of the military period in Argentina have been returning to political life at the will of democracy. Taylor observes the 1973 tribunal and the Never Again documents it produced resorted “to forms…that impede dealing with the exclusionary political nature of the violence and even participates in it” (1994, 196). In the trials of the coup d’etat and the oral narratives that they obtained, the actors within this political event were stripped of their political affiliations and “collective political motivations were thus not recognized” (1994, 197). While law was used to bring about truth, the law itself acted as an exclusionary force, perpetuating the “atomization of collective identities into rights and motivations of the individuals whose testimony the court admitted” (1994, 197). Taylor points to this kind of inherent “violence” in official memory projects aimed at the truth. The project of the truth commission also employs hierarchy, ordering what is necessary to include in the documentation and what is not, forcing some voices or central information out of the image, out of the imagined community of the new nation.
These removed voices become forgotten as remembering becomes “a process of forgetting…a process of simultaneously constructing some subjective and doing violence to others” (1994, 200). Although the TRC came long after the Argentina case and therefore could improve upon its predecessor, Posel notes its capacity too to exclude in its attempt to heal the nation’s: “…the cases heard in these hearings had to function as an appropriately representative sample of the whole—but only symbolically, not statistically” (2008, 138). This symbolic representation fit into the new mix of race, gender, and political affiliation that comprised its new “rainbow nation” and thus followed its own hierarchy and exclusions of potential reality of apartheid (2008, 139). Therefore, as Taylor aptly states, “memory does not only salvage, construct, and invent. Memory as constituted is exclusionary: it omits what hierarchy does not recognize,” and as such might contain “capacities to trivialize and exclude experience” (1994, 202). The construction of the truth for legal ends, even for truth itself, is political in nature, and thus, enacts a violence of its own, demonstrating the exclusionary nature of any universal claim (Taylor 1994, 199).
By distorting reality through documentation, whether through Never Again or the TRC’s symbolic rather than statistical representation of the nation, we may allow these violations to reoccur. Lessie Jo Frazier’s study, ““Subverted Memories”: Countermourning as Political Action in Chile”, explores how this process of exclusion and forgetting can be fought in what she explains as countermourning, the refusal to “relinquish the past and grope[s] toward a politics that might allow their memories integrity with a vision for the future” (1999, 105). The Chilean case too demonstrates the story of moving the nation out of a violent and painful past into the neoliberal state and economy. As the military sought to implement its own official memory by banning civil society actions, veterans fought in public spaces in what Jo Frazier terms the subversion of memory (1999, 106). Crypts and funerals, as sites of traumatic memory, provided a space of not only commemoration and remembrance, but also the enabling of but also political action (1999, 110). While she notes the homogenizing nature of the law and the truth commissions for healing, she comments that the work of mourning itself may not be sufficient to heal a damaged society: “Memory raised in elegy cannot transform the conditions of life. Without plot there may be ethics but there can be not politics, no hope of bliss” (1999, 111).
Instead, Jo Frazier advocates to look at memory as “praxis rather than text” (1999, 116). In Chile, the regime transition occurred without any major restructuring of the state or military order. In Argentina and elsewhere in Latin America, the Never Again documents did not bring torturers to justice nor did it prevent dictators from being reelected to office. To the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Posel comments that the “process of truth telling, in turn, forms a mode of justice which is more reconciliatory than punitive, based on the admissions of wrongdoing and the moral catharsis this affords” (2008, 126). While the rise of testimony and the use of memory have worked to reclaim the identity of minority groups, helped to transmit the past, and sought to repair the exclusions of the past, it has obtained an authority that promises redemption, promises a healing truth (Attwood 2008, 90). Testimony may offer catharsis and a release from the burdens of the past, but as Taylor and Jo Frazier note, this does not assure a politics or even justice as the cases show. While searching for the truth that will heal the damaged nation, the truth commission and its written productions may in fact exclude subjects as it brings the past into the present through trauma. Furthermore, the desiring of closure through this truth might only add to the difficulty in challenging this exclusion in the new “transitioned” nation.
Works Cited
1. Attwood, Bain, "In the Age of Testimony: The Stolen Generations Narrative, 'Distance' and Public History" Public Culture: Transnational Cultural Studies 20, 2008 : 75-96.
2. Frazier, Lessie Jo, "Subverted memories: Countermourning as Political Action in Chile [8pgs]" in , Acts of Memory U. Press of New England, 1999: 105-119.
3. Posel, Deborah, "History as Confession: The Case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission" Public Culture: Transnational Cultural Studies 20, 2008 : 119-141.
4. Taylor, Julie, "Body Memories: Aide-Memoires and Collective Amnesia in the Wake of Argentine Terror [6 pgs]" in , Body Politics: Disease, Desire, and the Family West View Press, 1994: pp. 192-203.